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Travis: Malpica-Orsini v. Blasi

MALPICA-ORSINI v. BLASI
ADOPTION-Illegitimate children-Constitutionallaw-Provision
of state's adoption law which requires the consent of the natural
mother but not the natural father is reasonable, not arbitrary,
and does not constitute a denial of equal protection of the law.
36 N.Y.2d 586, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975).
The New York Court of Appeals in Malpica-Orsiniv. Blasi'
upheld New York Domestic Relations Law section 1112 which
requires the consent of both parents in an adoption proceeding
unless the child is born out of wedlock, in which case the natural
father's consent is not required. In Malpica-Orsini,the natural
father of a child born out of wedlock challenged the constitutionality of the statute,3 asserting that it violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 He alleged that the statute
accorded less protection to unmarried fathers than to all other
1. 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), appeal dismissed for want
of a substanticlfederal question, 44 U.S.L.W. 3396 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1976) (Justices Brennan
and White would have noted probable jurisdiction).
2. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1974). The
section provides, in pertinent part,
Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be
required as follows:
1. Of the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge or
surrogate in his discretion dispenses with such consent;
2. Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child
born in wedlock;
3. Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock;
4. Of any person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the adoptive child.
The consent shall not be required of a parent who has abandoned the child
or who has surrendered the child to an authorized agency for the purpose of
adoption under the provisions of the social services law or the provisions of
section three hundred eighty-four of the social services law or who has been
deprived of civil rights or who is insane or who has been judicially declared
incompetent or who'is mentally retarded as defined by the mental hygiene law
or who has been adjudged to be an habitual drunkard or who has been judicially
deprived of the custody of the child on account of cruelty or neglect, or pursuant
to a judicial finding that the child is a permanently neglected child as defined
in section six hundred eleven of the family court act of the state of New York;
except that notice of the proposed adoption shall be given in such manner as
the judge or surrogate may direct to a parent if the judge or surrogate so orders.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the notice of a proposed
adoption nor any process in such proceeding shall be required to contain the
name of the person or persons seeking to adopt the child.
3. Id.
4. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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parents. The court rejected this argument and concluded that the
legislative classification is reasonable and not arbitrary and,
therefore, not in violation of the equal protection clause.
Judge Jones dissented, arguing that the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois' mandated a
reversal.6 Judge Fuchsberg concurred with Judge Jones and, in a
separate opinion, expressed the view that the statute is constitutionally defective due to its discrimination based upon sex.
Appellant Hector Orsini is the father of Heather Alison
Malpica-Orsini, who was born out of wedlock. When he learned
that the mother, Corrinne Caberti, was pregnant, Orsini proposed
marriage but was refused. After Heather was born, Orsini, Caberti, and their child lived together as a family for nearly two
years, at which time Caberti forced Orsini out of their residence.
Orsini nevertheless continued to provide support and pay rent.
He later admitted his paternity in a family court proceeding
and an order of filiation was issued. Pursuant to this order, Orsini
made regular support payments of $150 per month 7 and continued to exercise visitation rights. He also made numerous appointments for family counseling, but Ms. Caberti appeared only once.
Subsequently, she began to return the support payments, moved
to a new address, and refused to allow the father his visitation
rights.
In order to protect his relationship with his daughter, Orsini
moved for a court order to enforce the visitation rights granted
to him in the paternity proceeding.8 At the hearing on this motion, Ms. Caberti announced that she had married and that her
husband, respondent Blasi, wished to adopt Orsini's child. The
court denied the motion to secure the visitation rights and decided that Orsini's status and role should be considered at the
adoption proceeding. The court's decision stipulated that Orsini
5. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

6. Two lower New York courts have questioned the validity of section 111 of the New
York Domestic Relations Law in view of the Stanley decision. See In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 78 Misc. 2d 1039, 359 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1974); Doe v.

Department of Social Servs., 71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess
County 1972).

7. Appellant Orsini did not limit his support payments to $150 per month. He contributed as much as 80 percent of his net pay to insure that his daughter was adequately
provided for. Brief for Appellant at 5, Malpica-Orsini v. Blasi, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d
486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975).
8. Orsini never sought custody of his daughter because he felt it would have been a

"futile exercise." Conversation with Marvin Srulowitz, Attorney for Appellant, Sept. 25,
1975.
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should be given notice and an opportunity to be heard at the
adoption proceeding where his objections would be given the
same "force and effect" 9 given to those of a father of an inwedlock child.
The end result of adoption by respondent Blasi would be not
merely the termination of Orsini's visitation rights, but also all
other parental rights. "Adoption is the legal proceeding whereby
a person takes another person into the relation of child and
thereby acquires the rights and incurs the responsibilities of parent in respect of such other person." 10 The former parent consequently relinquishes all such rights and obligations.
In New York, in order to effect a private-placement adoption," a consent must be validly executed. 2 If the child is born
in wedlock, it is necessary to obtain the consent of the parents or
the surviving parent.'3 But if the child is born out of wedlock, as
in Malpica-Orsini,only the consent of the mother is required.'4
At the hearing to determine whether the adoption petition
should be granted, counsel for respondent Blasi stipulated that
Orsini was "not unfit, that he did not abandon his child, and that
no other statutory reason existed for waiving his consent. . . but
for the fact that he was not married to his daughter's mother."'"
The petition for adoption of the child was granted over Orsini's
objections. The court concluded that Orsini's consent was not
necessary under section 111, and that the failure of the section to
require his consent did not affect the constitutional validity of the
provision.
On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, appellant Orsini contended that the statute violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the United States Constitution. The basis
of his challenge was that the statute unjustly discriminated between fathers of children born out of wedlock and all other par9. The phrase "force and effect" was not defined by the court. Brief for Appellant at
6-7, Malpica-Orsini v. Blasi, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975).
10. N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1964), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
11. For an excellent discussion of the differences between private-placement adoptions requiring consents and agency-placement adoptions requiring surrenders, see Parents v. Dumpson, 81 Misc. 2d 132, 364 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1975).
12.. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 115(7) (McKinney 1964), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
13. Id. § 111(2), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
14. Id. § 111(2), as amended, (Supp. 1974); accord, In re Adoption of Brousal, 66
Misc. 2d 711, 322 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1971); In re Adoption of Marino,
168 Misc. 158, 5 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1938).
15. Brief for Appellant at 8, Malpica-Orsini v. Blasi, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486,
370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975).
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ents. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the court
of appeals determined that the statutory classification should not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify its existence.'" To demonstrate that such a state of facts
did in fact exist, the court asserted that this "veto power"' if
given to putative fathers would "have the overall affect of denying homes to the homeless"'" or "[a]t the very least, the worthy
process of adoption would be severely impeded."'"
To further demonstrate the validity of the statutory classification, the court noted that "[g]reat difficulty and expense
would be encountered. . . in locating the putative father to ascertain his willingness to consent.""0 The court also expressed
concern that persons would be dissuaded from adopting "out of
fear of subsequent annoyance";2 that the resultant difficulty of
obtaining adoptions at an early time after birth would increase
trauma in the child and add considerable expense to institutions
and agencies;22 that black marketing of children would increase;23
that denial of consent could be used as a means of revenge;2 4 and
that subsequent marriages of the unwed mother would be frustrated as a prospective husband might only be a foster parent and
not be able to adopt the mother's children. 25 The court then con20
cluded:
Certainly these facts demonstrate that the classification is reasonable, not arbitrary, and keeping in mind the paramount consideration of a child's welfare, the legislative action is justified.
Although it is somewhat difficult to ascertain from the opinion, it must be assumed that this is the test of equal protection
16. Malpica-Orsini v. Blasi, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 571, 331 N.E.2d 486, 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d
511, 515 (1975).

Judicial deference to conceivable state purposes has diminished in equal protection
challenges. The state must demonstrate that there is a basis "in actuality, not merely in
conjecture." Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword.In Search of Evotving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 21 (1972).
17. Malpica-Orsini v. Blasi, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 573, 331 N.E.2d 486, 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d
511, 516 (1975).
18. Id. at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 573, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 573, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 574, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
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applied by the court. In this respect, the court's conclusion is
questionable. In dealing with such an important right as the relationship between parent and child, a stricter test of equal protec2
tion must be applied. 1
Even if the equal protection test selected by the court was
the appropriate one, its application to section 111 raises additional questions. The court ignored the fact that vesting "veto
power" over adoption in unwed fathers presents no greater dangers than in the case where a child is born in wedlock. In such a
case, both parents may withhold consent leading to the very results feared by the court. Furthermore, no consideration was
given to the possibility that the mother of an illegitimate child
might abuse her right of consent. Thus, while the court established that there is a rational basis for dispensing with consent
requirements, it failed to speak to the issue at hand-the validity
of the legislative decision to require the consent of some parents
but not others.
Given the fact that counsel for respondent Blasi had stipulated that Orsini was not unfit, by holding that his consent was
not required, it can only be inferred that the court has set up an
irrebuttable presumption that putative fathers are unfit for parenthood-that they do not seek to promote the interests of their
children. This rationale is invalid in two respects. The United
States Supreme Court held in Stanley v. Illinois2s that such "procedure by presumption" is unconstitutional. Secondly, society
has come to recognize that fathers-wed or unwed-are playing
an increasingly important role in the family and have rights toward their children that must be preserved.
Changing social and economic realities have significantly altered the roles of men and women. The influence of the women's
movement, as well as economic necessity, have resulted in a vast
increase in the number of working women. 29 No longer is it
thought' that "[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman
are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This
27. See text accompanying notes 68-77 infra.
28. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
29..In April, 1971, approximately 32 million women, 42.7% of all women
sixteen years or older, were in the labor force, compared with 28.9% in March,
1940. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Employment and Earnings 34-35 (May 1971).
Brief for Appellant at 6, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See Francke, PuttingFather
Back in the Family, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 22, 1975, at 54.
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is the law of the Creator."30 An aspect of this trend is that fathers
are playing an increasingly active role in the rearing of their children. In many situations, this results from the mother earning a
higher salary than her husband, 3' thereby encouraging the father
to assume the domestic responsibilities. This, however, is not the
only reason. Many fathers simply choose to assume a more active
role in the care of their children" and "there is a new consciousness that fathers may be just as suited for child care as mothers.

'13

This awareness is evidenced by the fact that courts are

increasingly willing to grant custody of a child to the father.3 '
In determining who should be granted custody, the court will
look to which parent will best serve the interests of the child. 31
Traditionally, the courts have simply applied the "tender years
presumption," granting custody to the mother without regard to
the father's relative fitness. The rationale for this presumption
was explained by the Supreme Court of Washington:36
Mother love is a dominant trait in even the weakest of women,
and as a general thing surpasses the paternal affection for the
common offspring, and moreover, a child needs a mother's care
even more than a father's. For these reasons, courts are loathe
to deprive the mother of the custody of her children, and will
not do so unless it is shown clearly that she is so far an unfit and
improper person to be intrusted with such custody as to endanger the welfare of the children.
Some recent cases have upheld this presumption and have
30. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
31. According to the Census Bureau in 1970, wives earned more than their husbands
in 3.2 million or 7.4 percent of American families. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1973, at 40, col.
1.
32. See, e.g., Dullea, Who Gets Custody of Children?FathersAre Now Being Heeded,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1975, at 44, cols. 1-2.
33. Francke, Putting Father Back in the Family, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 22, 1975, at 54,
col. 1.
34. See, e.g., In re Richard, 537 P.2d 363, 122 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1975); Stom v. Stom,
226 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1975); In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27
(1967); Godinez v. Russo, 49 Misc. 2d 66 (Fain. Ct. Westchester County 1966). See
generally Dullea, Wo Gets Custody of Children? FathersAre Now Being Heeded, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 14, 1975, at 44, col. 1.
35. A noted authority has suggested that a more realistic approach is to determine
what would be the "least detrimental alternative," because a child whose placement must
be decided in a legal controversy has already been deprived of his or her "best interests."
J. GOLDsTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 62 (1973);
accord, DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 923 n.1 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1975).
36. Freeland v. Freeland, 99 Wash. 482, 159 P. 698, 699 (1916).
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taken custody away from fathers who were otherwise deemed to
be fit.371 The current trend of legal thinking has, however, approached this area without "sex preconceptions of any kind."3
Courts have recognized that fathers are capable of promoting the
best interests of the child and that "[tihe simple fact of being a
mother does not, by itself, indicate a capacity or willingness to
render a quality of care different from the care the father can
provide." 9
It has been suggested that recent Supreme Court decisions
indicate that preferential treatment "on the basis of sex of the
kind created by the 'tender years presumption' is 'suspect' and
therefore subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny."4 As one court
has remarked, "there is today no inflexible rule which requires
that custody of children, especially of tender age, be vested in the
mother. Equality of sexes has entered this field."'"
At common law, a father did not have a legally recognized
37. See, e.g., Love v. Love, 533 P.2d 280 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1974); Davidyan v. Davidyan, 229 Pa. Super. 495, 327 A.2d 139 (1974).
38. People ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 180, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (Fam.
Ct. N.Y. County 1973). See also In re Marriage of Pokrzywinski, 221 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa
Sup. Ct. 1974).
39. People ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 181, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289 (Fain.
Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
40. Id. at 182-83, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 290. It should be noted that the majority opinion
in Malpica-Orsinifailed to reach this important issue. The dissenting opinion of Judge
Fuchsberg recognized this and maintained that the statutory classification based on gender dictated a reversal.
There has been much discussion of whether sex is a "suspect" classification and
therefore subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. Those who maintain that it is suspect
gain support from Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), where it was stated that
"classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or natural
origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."
Id. at 687. This view was stated in a plurality opinion, however, and was unable to gain
the support of the majority of the Justices. In cases challenging gender-based discrimination following Frontiero, the Court found it unnecessary to decide if sex was a suspect
classification. See Stanton v. Stanton, 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975). Nevertheless, it is clear that gender-based discrimination is an area
in which the Court exercises some "special sensitivity." Gunther, The Supreme Court
1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine in a Changing Court:A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1972).
In the recent case of Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 1 FAM. L. REP. 2815 (Mass. Sup.
Jud. Ct. Sept. 22, 1975), a Massachusetts statute imposing criminal penalities for fathering illegitimate children, with no similar sanction against the mother, was held to be a
denial of equal protection on the basis of gender discrimination.
41. Marcus v. Marcus, 24 Ill. App. 3d 401, 320 N.E.2d 581, 585 (1974) (custody
granted to the father). It should also be noted that the National Organization for Women
maintains that the proposition that mothers possess a superior right to custody is not only
contrary to NOW policy, but is in "direct contravention" to the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment..1 FAM. L. REP. 2056 (1974).
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right to the custody of his illegitimate issue. The right to custody
of illegitimate children vested solely with the mother.42 This rule
was based upon the fiction that an illegitimate child had no father known to the law.43 Illegitimacy was viewed as a social wrong,
and a disgrace."
To continue to deny the putative father custody of his child
on the basis of such outdated moral judgments is questionable.
Of greater significance is the fact that such a rule may produce
results that are contrary to the best interests of the child:45
Assuming that the act of having children out of wedlock is a
social wrong and one to be considered in a custody proceeding,
the parties are in pari delicto on that issue. The assumption that
the father is somehow more blameworthy than the mother belongs to a prior age. The case should be treated as one between
wedded parents and. the focus should be on the best interest of
the child.
Today, a number of courts are granting custody to fathers of
illegitimate children, reflecting the realization that the child's
interests may be better protected by the father than the mother.
In support of its conclusion that "a willing father of an illegiti42. H. KRAUSE. ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1971); accord,Lund v. Lund,
26 Cal. 2d 472, 479, 159 P.2d 643, 647 (1945).
43. See, e.g., Brewer v. Blougher, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 177, 198 (1840); Doughty v.
Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 P. 619 (1923).
44. Id. In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972), the Court
observed:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.... Obviously,
no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent.
That the suffering of a child is accentuated when the child is born out of wedlock is
App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), where an
evidenced in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill.
illegitimate son sued his natural father in a "wrongful life" action. Damages were sought
for deprivation of his right to be legitimate, to have a normal home, to have a legal father,
to inherit from his father and paternal ancestors, and for being stigmatized a bastard. The
court recognized that all the elements of a willful tort were present, but denied recovery
and deferred the question to the legislature, fearing the legal implications and ramifications of granting relief.
45. Schwartz, Rights of a Father with Regard to His Illegitimate Child, 36 OHIO ST.
L.J, , 9 (1975).
46. In re Guardianship of C., 98 N.J. Super. 474, 487, 237 A.2d 652, 659 (Juv. & Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1967). See also Godinez v. Russo, 49 Misc. 2d 66, 266 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Fain. Ct.
Westchester County 1966). State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1,
207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
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mate child should have a right to custody if it is in the best
interests of the child,"46 one court observed:4"
Can it be said that a father loves a child only when he is
married to the child's mother? Love can neither be created nor
destroyed by law. The love between a parent and his child is
universal to humanity; it is not governed by the local laws of
marriage and legitimacy.
Courts have also granted custody to the putative father
based on the rationale that custody is a right corresponding with
the obligation to pay support.48 In a decision that found that the
best interests of the child would be served by granting custody to
the natural father, the court reasoned:49
The current trend of legal thinking focuses on the proposition
that since a putative father has statutory duties toward his child
born out of wedlock then he should also, assuming that he is a
fit and proper person, have corresponding rights of custody.
In Stanley v. Illinois," the United States Supreme Court held
that the failure to provide unwed fathers the right to a hearing
on fitness, a right accorded to all other parents whose custody of
their children was challenged by the state, constitutes a denial of
equal protection of the law. The Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment required that the petitioner
be granted a hearing before his children were taken away from
him.51
Under Illinois law, children of unwed fathers became wards
of the state upon the death of their mother. This was based upon
the fiction that unwed fathers are not "parents" and, therefore,
any existing relationship with their children may be ignored. A
''parent" was defined as the father or mother of a legitimate
child, the natural mother of an illegitimate child, or any adoptive
47. In re Guardianship of C., 98 N.J. Super. 474, 492, 237 A.2d 652, 662 (Juv. & Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1967).
48. See, e.g., In re P., 36 Mich. App. 497, 194 N.W.2d 18 (1972); In re Guardianship
of C., 98 N.J. Super. 474, 237 A.2d 652 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1967). See also N.Y. FAM.
CT. AcT § 513 (McKinney 1963) which provides, inter alia, that "[elach parent of a child
born out of wedlock is liable for the necessary support and education of the child and for
the child's funeral expenses."
49. In re P., 36 Mich. App. 497, 194 N.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1972).
50. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
51. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun dissented on the ground that the due
process issue had never been raised in the lower courts and therefore the Court should have
addressed itself solely to the equal protection issue. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 65961 (1972).
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parent. "' The statute specifically excluded unwed fathers. In this
respect, it is strikingly similar to the New York statute challenged
in Malpica-Orsini.
In Stanley, the state insisted that most unmarried fathers are
not suited for parenthood. 53 The Court recognized that all such
fathers are not necessarily unfit and that some may be well suited
for parenthood. 4 Furthermore, in response to the state's argument that administrative inconvenience occasioned by an inquiry
in every case could not be justified in light of the fact that putative fathers are so seldom fit, the Court reasoned:"
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to
achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy
of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed,
one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier
than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and
care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to
past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child. It, therefore, cannot stand.
In Malpica-Orsini,the court accepted the very reasoning rejected in Stanley, and based its decision, in part, on the inconveniences and delays that might result from allowing putative fathers the right to consent. However, in light of the reasoning set
forth in Stanley and the fact that permitting the father to consent
"would add merely a small increment to the large amount of red
tape adoptive parents already face, '57 the court's concern does
not appear compelling.
52. h.i.. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-14 (Smith-Hurd 1972), as amended, (Cum. Supp.
1975).
53. 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972).

54. Id.
55. Id. at 656-57.
56. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
57. Comment, The Emerging ConstitutionalProtectionof the Putative Father'sParental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1591 (1972).
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The narrow reading given to Stanley by the court in MalpicaOrsini is inconsistent with the view of the Supreme Court. In
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services,', the Supreme
Court of Washington upheld statutory provisions similar to that
considered in Malpica-Orsini.The United States Supreme Court
vacated and remanded this judgment for reconsideration in light
of Stanley. 9 On remand," the highest court of Washington reversed its prior position and construed the state's adoption statute so that the "[c]onsent of both the unwed mother and the
unwed father, or consent of one with the proper termination of the
parental rights of the other, is necessary.'
In another case decided shortly after Stanley, People ex rel.
Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home,6 2 the Supreme Court of
Illinois reviewed a lower court decision which denied a putative
father's application seeking custody of his child. The lower court
based its decision on the fact that the child had been legally
adopted in a proceeding to which the natural mother had consented. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Stanley, the court reversed and held that "the interests of the
father of an illegitimate child are no different from those of other
parents.""3
In Miller v. Miller,64 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered issues similar to those involved in MalpicaOrsini. The plaintiff in Miller challenged the constitutionality of
an Oregon statute 5 which permitted the adoption of a child born
out of wedlock upon consent of the natural mother without notice
to or the consent of the natural father. The statute expressly
provided that "the father of the child shall be disregarded just as
if he were dead."6 Relying on Stanley, the court held the statute
58. 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970).
59. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), decided on remand
sub. noma. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826
(1973).
On the same day as Rothstein, the Court also vacated and remanded in light of
Stanley, Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), which involved a custody issue.
On remand in Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 Ill. App. 3d 260, 292 N.E.2d 145 (1972),
custody was granted to the father.
60. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
61. Id., 207 N.W.2d at 830.
62. 52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
63. Id., 284 N.E.2d at 292.
64. 504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974).

65.

ORE. REv. STAT.

§ 109.326(1) (1974).

66. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 8

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 4, 1976]

to be constitutionally null and void on the ground that it infringed upon the rights of the appellant and all fathers similarly
situated."
In determining whether a state statute has violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme.
Court has applied various standards. In F. S. Royster Guano v.
5 one such standard was articulated as follows: 9
Virginia,"
[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relationship to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
As previously noted, this appears to be the standard"0 applied
by the court in Malpica-Orsini.When, however, the classification
involved is one considered "suspect," 7 ' or the interest affected is
deemed "fundamental, 7 2 a stricter standard of judicial scrutiny
is applied.
In Levy v. Louisiana,7 3 the Supreme Court held that a Louisiana statute which deprived illegitimate children of the right to
recover damages as a result of the wrongful death of their mother
was in violation of the equal protection clause. In a discussion of
74
the proper standard to be applied, the Court stated:
In applying the Equal Protection Clause to social and economic
legislation, we give great latitude to the legislation in making
classifications. . . . [But] we have been extremely sensitive
when it comes to basic civil rights and have not hesitated to
strike down an invidious classification even though it had history and tradition on its side.
Four years later, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,75
the Supreme Court held that the Louisiana workmen's compensation law, which denied recovery to illegitimate children, vio67. It should be-noted that the Solicitor General of the State of Oregon conceded that
the statute was "out of harmony with the Federal Constitution." Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d
1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 1974).
68. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
69. Id. at 415.
70. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
71. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race). See also note 32 supra for a
discussion of whether sex is a suspect classification.
72. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)(right to travel).
73. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
74. Id. at 71.
75. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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485

lated the equal protection clause. Justice Powell reaffirmed the
reasoning of Levy when he said:76
Though the latitude given state economic and social regulation
is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, the Court
exercises a stricter scrutiny.
This "strict scrutiny" when dealing with fundamental rights requires that the state must demonstrate that "the exclusions are
necessary to promote a compelling state interest."77 Furthermore,
"if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a
lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may
not choose the way of greater interference."" "In other words, the
classification must be tailored so that the exclusion of appellant
and the members of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated state goal." 79
There is little doubt that the interest asserted by appellant
Orsini in the principle case is one deemed "fundamental."8 In
Stanley, the Court indicated that:8'
It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody and management of his or her children "come[s]
to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal
is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements."
In a recent case, the Supreme Court held that "freedom of
personal choices in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 2 This reaffirms the Court's prior position
in Meyer v. Nebraska,8 3 where it was held that "[w]ithout doubt
. . .the right of the individual to. . .establish a home and bring
up children" 84 was a liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amend76. Id. at 172.
77. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)(right to vote).
78. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972)(right to vote).
79. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
80. "The parent's interest in the liberty of the child, in his care and in his control,
has long been recognized as a fundamental interest." Cleaver v. Wilcox, 40 U.S.L.W. 2658,
2659 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 1972), rev'd on othergrounds, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
81. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
82. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974).
83. 262 U.S. 390'(1923).
84. Id. at 399. See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), where the
Court, in a discussion of marriage and procreation, stated: "We are dealing here with
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ment. The New York Court of Appeals has previously acknowledged the importance of this right. In W. v. G.11 the court proclaimed that "the relationship between minor children and their
natural parents is jealously guarded."86 Thus, the interests of
natural parents with respect to their children are fundamental.
If the state elects to make a classification which affects such an
interest, it must be able to demonstrate a compelling state purpose.
The state in its capacity as parens patriae 7 has as its "primary concern . . . the welfare of the children involved""8 and an
interest in making adoptions possible in proper cases. 9 It is submitted that it is not necessarily true that the father of an illegitimate child must marry the child's mother to serve these interests.
In Glona v. American Guarantee Co.," the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a Louisiana law depriving the mother
of an illegitimate child of the right to sue for the wrongful death
of her son. In rejecting the argument that "since the legislature
is dealing with 'sin,' it can deal with it selectively," 91 the Court
stated:92
To say that the test of equal protection should be the "legal"
rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man."
85. 34 N.Y.2d 76, 312 N.E.2d 171, 356 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1974).
86. Id. at 80, 312 N.E.2d at 174, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
One New York court has taken the extreme position that "the right of a paient under
natural law is a fundamental one and except for extraordinary cause, beyond the reach of
any court or Legislature." In re Three "John" Children, 61 Misc. 2d 347, 363, 306 N.Y.S.2d
797, 813 (Fain. Ct. Citywide Child Abuse Term 1969).
87. It is, however, well settled law that the State as parens patriae is the supreme guardian of all minors within its jurisdiction, and that courts of equity,
as part of the State's judicial system have inherent power, and will when their
jurisdiction is duly invoked, intervene to protect the welfare and best interest
of minor children whose welfare is jeopardized by controversies between their
parents, and the court may deprive either or both of their custody and place
them in the custody of a third person or institution, regarding the best interest
of the child as the paramount consideration.
Arnold v. Arnold, 246 Ala. 86, 18 So. 2d 730, 734 (1944); accord, Helton v. Crowley, 241
Iowa 296, 41 N.W.2d 60, 69-79 (1950); Chandler v. Chandler, 56 Wash. 2d 399, 353 P.2d
417, 420-21 (1960).
88. Malpica-Orsini v. Blasi, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 578, 331 N.E.2d 486, 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d
511, 521 (1975).
89. Rosendall v. Ahmed, 44 Cal. App. 3d 810, 814, 118 Cal. Rptr. 853, 855 (Ct. App.
1st Dep't 1975).
90. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
91. Id. at 75.
92, Id. at 75-76.
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the Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of
a State to draw such "legal" lines as it chooses.
Simply because a father is not the legal parent of his child,
in the sense that he is not married to the child's mother, it does
not necessarily follow that there is no parent-child relationship
present. This position is reflected in the Uniform Parentage Act 3
which defines a parent-child relationship as "the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents,
incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges,
duties and obligations."9 Any doubt cast by the use of the word
"legal" is clarified in section 2 of the Act which provides that
"[t]he parent and child relationship extends equally to every
child and every parent, regardless of the marital status of the
parents."95
Furthermore, simply because the father is not the legal parent to his child, it does not necessarily follow that there is not a
meaningful parent-child relationship present. What should be
determinative is not legality, but whether the relationship has
developed so that the parent has become the "psychological parent." This relationship evolves from "day-to-day interactions,
companionship, and shared experiences."9 7 A noted authority refers to this as a "positive" father-child relationship and maintains:"
[T]he important question is not whether he has established a
"legal" father-child relationship, but rather whether he has established a "positive" father-child relationship. This is the
point missed by tho'e cases which reason that since it is expressly provided that the consent of the mother only is suffi-.
cient, once her consent is given, that of the father becomes
unnecessary.
Therefore, if the classification must be "tailored . . . to
achieve the articulated state goal"99 in order to withstand the
constitutional mandate of equal protection, the state must not
93.

UNIFORM PARENTAGE

ACT, 1973

HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS

ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS & PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING

339.

94. Id. § 1.
95. Id. § 2.

96. J.

GOLDSTEIN,

A.

FREUD,

A.

SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

19 (1973).
97. Id.
98. S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 121 (1971).
99. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
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exclude those putative fathers who are promoting the welfare of
the child. A number of states have attempted to avoid this constitutional defect and require consent of those putative fathers who
have acknowledged paternity of the child.' The mere establishment of paternity, however, does not necessarily mean that the
father is promoting the state's interest in the welfare of the child.
As noted in the dissenting opinion of Judge Jones, several
states have recognized this fact.'"' For example, the Arizona
adoption statute'0 provides that the putative father has the right
to consent if he has acknowledged parentage under oath or if his
parentage has been established in a judicial proceeding.0 3 However, the court may waive the requirement qf consent of the putative father or any other person required to give consent if the
court determines this will best promote the interests of the
child. ' 4 Before such a determination is made, a hearing with
actual notice to all persons adversely affected must be held. Also,
the court must issue a written finding on all of the facts upon
which the order is founded.0 5
In Malpica-Orsini,the court attempted to justify the classification made by section 111 on the theory that if the putative
father were granted the right to consent, he could use this as a
"veto power" and thereby block the adoption. If the putative
father is in fact maintaining a "positive" relationship with the
child, however, then the adoption may not be in the best interests
of the child and consent may be rightfully withheld.
100. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN.'§ 56-106 (1971); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.31, .33 (Cure. Supp. 1975), amending MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
710.3 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.040 (1973); accord, REv. UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 5(2),
1969 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONiPERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS & PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 169.
101. Malpica-Orsini v. Blasi, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 587, 331 N.E.2d 486, 499, 370 N.Y.S.2d
511, 529-30 (1975).
The Iowa Supreme Court in Catholic Charities v. Zaletsky, 1 FAM. L. REP. 2789 (Iowa
Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 1975), has recently upheld IOWA CODE ANN. § 660.3 (Supp. 1975),
amending IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.3 (1950) which provides that if the parents of the child
to be adopted are not married, then the parent "having the care and providing for the
wants of the child may give consent." The court reasoned that "the difference between
caring and non-caring parents bears a rational relationship to the state objective [of]
...
. promotion of the welfare and best interests of all children within the state."
Catholic Charities v. Zaletsky, supra at 2790.
102. ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (1974).
103. Id. § 8-106(A)(1)(d) (1974).
104. Id. § 8-106(C) (1974); accord, In re Holman's Adoption, 80 Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d
372 (1956); Anderson v. Pima County Dep't of Public Welfare, 71 Ariz. 339, 271 P.2d 834
(1954).
105. Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(C) (1974).
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New York Domestic Relations Law section 111 sets forth
certain standards which can preclude the necessity of a parent's
consent, irrespective of his or her marital status. Consent is not
required of a parent who has abandoned the child, surrendered
the child for adoption, or has been deprived of civil rights, declared insane, incompetent, or mentally retarded, adjudged an
habitual drunkard, or judicially deprived of custody of the child
on account of cruelty or neglect." 6
If the statute were amended to allow the putative fathers who
have acknowledged parentage the right to consent, the party or
parties petitioning for adoption would be able to question the
validity of the consent in accordance with the standards given
above.0 7 The burden of proof rests with the petitioner to prove
that the parent has in fact transgressed the statute.15 As evidenced in the recent case of W. v. G.,111 this is, indeed, a difficult
burden to satisfy. In W. v. G., the natural father, divorced from
his wife, withheld consent to the adoption of his children. Since
the divorce, the-father had made no regular support payments
and had maintained a minimal amount of contact with his children. The children had expressed a desire to be adopted by their
mother's new husband. Nevertheless, the court refused to find
that the father was guilty of abandonment under section 111.
Since the children were born in wedlock, the consent of the father
was required before the adoption petition could be granted. His
refusal to grant consent resulted in the termination of the adoption proceeding.
This case demonstrates two points. The first is that the
court's fear of "veto power" in Malpica-Orsini is applicable to
both wed and unwed parents. In a divorce situation, such as that
presented in W. v. G., either parent can withhold consent and
thereby effectively terminate an adoption proceeding. Secondly,
the case reveals that if courts must adhere strictly to the consent
requirement of the adoption statute, they may, in effect, prevent
the advancement of the state's interest in promoting the welfare
of children. The moral and temporal interests of the child, not the
right of the parents to grant or withhold consent, are the primary
concern of a court in an adoption proceeding." 0
106. See note 2 supra.
107. N.Y. FAm. CT. R. 6B.l(e)(iii) (McKinney 1963).
108. See, e.g., In re Mark's Adoption, 159 Misc. 348, 287 N.Y.S. 800 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1936).
109. 34 N.Y.2d 76, 312 N.E.2d 171, 356 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1974).
110. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Widrick, 25 Misc. 2d 1078, 212 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sur.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 8

Hofstra Law Review

490

[Vol. 4, 19761

It is proposed, therefore, that the statute be amended to
allow the courts to waive the requirement of consent, if this will
serve to promote the best interests of the child. Such would be
the case when either parent unreasonably withholds consent. It
would be difficult, if not impossible, to set forth definitive objective standards by which a court should determine whether consent should be waived. Instead, this must be done on an ad hoc
basis, by closely examining the facts of each particular case. In
this respect, the state must rely on the integrity of its courts.
In In re Tyease "J","'an unwed mother objected to the petition of adoption of her daughter and, therefore, withheld consent.
The court referred to section 111 as an "outmoded legislative
structure""' and stated that the fears expressed by the court in
Malpica-Orsinias to the veto power of the unwed father may be
equally applicable to the unwed mother, who may be opposed to
the best interests of the child." 3 However, the court was less concerned with the consent rights of the parents than it was with the
protection of the child. In a plea for reform, the court observed:"'
It is the respectful hope of this court that all seven of the
members of the Court of Appeals, and the Legislature as well,
will indeed equate the rights of the mother and father, wed or
unwed, but equate them downward to the level of the almost
submerged rights of the infant. These infants of tender years
have rights as human beings, rights of equal stature to those of
their parents, rights that are emerging as of constitutional dimension, rights to a permanent home so fundamental as to negate any parent's veto of adoption, statutory or otherwise, if the
circumstances provide a factual showing strong enough ...
Hopefully our Legislature will revise our statute so that flexibility and constitutionality will converge in balancing the equities
of the fathers', mothers', and infants' rights; the latter need the
protection more than the maturer parents, and so the infants'
constitutional rights to a permanent, stable, suitable home
would frequently be controlling over parental vetoes.
The Malpica-Orsinicourt's fear of "veto power" in the hands
of fathers of illegitimate children does not sustain this statutory
Ct, St. Lawrence County 1960); In re Adoption of Geiger, 138 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sur. Ct.
Suffolk County 1955); In re Adoption of Blachinsky, 127 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sur. Ct. Queens

County 1953).
111. 373 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1975).

112. Id. at 451.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 451-52.
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classification. The court neglected to consider that such an abuse
of consent might pertain to all parents-wed, unwed, male, or
female. In this respect, the statutory classification is both unreasonable and arbitrary.
"Reasonable, and not arbitrary," however, is not the proper
test of equal protection in this case. The fundamental right asserted by appellant Orsini mandates that a compelling state interest be demonstrated. Furthermore, the statutory classification
must not exclude those persons who are promoting the state's
interest. The court's blanket exclusion of fathers of illegitimate
children ignores contemporary social realities which indicate that
fathers of both in-wedlock and out-of-wedlock children are capable of advancing the state's interest in promoting the welfare of
its children.
In order to pass constitutional muster, the statute must be
amended. Fathers who have acknowledged paternity should be
accorded an equal right to consent. This, however, does not suffice. The courts should be granted the statutory authority to obviate the necessity of consent when either parent is not promoting
the best interests of his or her child. It is essential that the courts
be granted flexibility in dealing with intricate family problems.
Until such amendments are enacted, the statute will suffer
from the constitutional defect of violating the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. For, as illustrated by
Malpica-Orsini,the statute precludes those fathers who wish to
promote the welfare of their children, thereby frustrating its own
articulated goal.
Norton L. Travis
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